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Abstract
This paper evaluates the qualitative and quantitative implications of nancial
dedollarization of rms' liabilities on real aggregates in a small open economy
model. We extend the standard Cespedes, Chang, and Velasco (2004) model
by allowing entrepreneurs borrow in both foreign and domestic currency so as
to nance rms' capital needs. A real depreciation reduces the value of rms'
net worth whenever there is a currency mismatch in their balance sheets. Un-
der exible exchange rates, a lower degree of dollarization lessens the negative
impact on output and investment, since there is a smaller increase in the cost of
external borrowing. The quantitative results show that the balance sheet chan-
nel accounts for about 70 percent of the output and investment drop in Peru
following the Russian Crisis, and a reduction in debt dollarization would have
reduced output drop in 0.9 percentage points of GDP.
Keywords: Small open economy, balance sheet eects, dollarization.
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In recent years, following the severe impact of the 1997-98 nancial crises, emerging
market countries have been implementing a set of policies aimed at improving the
currency composition of their debt so as to reduce nancial fragility and the likelihood
of being exposed to a nancial crisis.
A vast literature emerged after these crises, which provided the theoretical argu-
ments that explain how nancial shocks may have real eects, through their impact
on the balance sheets of rms, due to a currency mismatch between assets and lia-
bilities. In order to simplify the theoretical framework, a common assumption in this
class of models is that agents are only allowed to borrow in foreign currency, so that
all debt is denominated in dollars and is fully exposed to currency risk.1 The main
motivation is the failure of emerging markets to borrow at long maturities in their
own currency.2
However, the ability of a country to contract debt in dierent currencies seems to
be relevant in practice. Reinhart, Rogo, and Savastano (2003b) show that it is not
clear that emerging markets can only borrow in foreign currency as stated in the orig-
inal sin hypothesis. They argue notwithstanding that the degree of debt intolerance
can be explained through more underlying factors such as the quality of institutions
and a history of good economic management. Debt dollarization seems to arise as
a response to nancial market conditions, where countries with shallow and illiquid
nancial markets choose dollarization as an alternative source of nancing.3 There-
fore, it is relevant to analyze what the ability of debt dedollarization is in reducing the
exposure of emerging countries to nancial crises and how they can help to mitigate
the balance sheet channel through which nancial shocks aect real variables.
In this paper we evaluate the qualitative and quantitative implications of nancial
dedollarization of rms' liabilities on real aggregates in a small open economy. We
extend the standard Cespedes, Chang, and Velasco (2004) (CCV henceforth) model
by allowing entrepreneurs borrow in both foreign and domestic currency (soles) so
as to nance rms' capital needs. To deal with the issue of borrowing in dierent
currencies, we consider two types of entrepreneurs, investors and savers, which for
the time being are catalogued exogenously. Both types are endowed each period
with a certain amount of net worth, but only investors can buy productive capital.
Nevertheless, savers can prot from their net worth by lending their soles to investors,
who can borrow from abroad as well. The proportion of investors determines the
extent of nancial dollarization in this economy. External borrowing is subject to
agency costs.
After characterizing the optimal contract, we show that under exible exchange
rates, a lower degree of dollarization reduces agency costs and the volatility of output
in terms of home goods. Since investors face a lower risk premium, the output drop
1Levy-Yeyati (2006) argues that the main disadvantage of nancial dollarization is related to the
incidence of balance sheet eects in the event of a sharp real exchange rate depreciation, as debtors
may no longer be able to service their dollar denominated debt.
2This is the hypothesis of original sin introduced by Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999).
3Countries with a bad credit history have more domestic dollarization than the ones with no
default history. The sample considered in Reinhart, Rogo, and Savastano (2003b) shows a wide
variety of degrees of debt dollarization depending on their default history, with a mean dollarization
of 0.3 percent for non-defaulters and 16 percent for countries that have a history of default.
2following an unanticipated increase in the world interest rate is smaller the lower the
degree of the currency mismatch. We provide a link between debt dollarization and
nancial fragility.4 In the limit, when investors only borrow in soles, without being
exposed to a currency mismatch, the economy is always in the nancially robust case.
Our quantitative analysis suggests that the gains from changing the currency
denomination of debt is signicant compared to the eect of nancial imperfections
due to the costly state verication problem. Changing the currency composition of
debt reduces the eect on output by 0.8 percentage points, whereas switching o the
risk premium due to the agency problem reduces the eect on output by 0.1 percentage
points. Similar eects are obtained in other real variables such as investment (1.9
percent due to currency mismatch versus 0.2 percent due to agency costs) and real
depreciation (2.0 percent due to currency mismatch versus 1.3 percent due to agency
costs).
We simulate the model for 10,000 periods and compute the variance of consump-
tion deviations from the deterministic steady state for debt denominated in dollars
and in soles as an approximate measure of the welfare component related to insur-
able risk. The variance of consumption is 0.007 for the benchmark case with full
dollar-denominated debt, larger than the variance of consumption 0.0042 with full
sol-denominated debt.
This paper contributes to several strands of the literature. The fact that the
quantitative eects of nancial frictions in this class of models is very mild has already
been studied for closed economy models in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)
and Christensen and Dib (2008). The dierence in the impact of a shock to interest
rates in the model with and without nancial frictions is of the order of 0.1 percent of
deviations from steady state.5 Our results are also in line with Kocherlakota (2000)
and Cordoba and Ripoll (2004), who nd that nancial frictions under standard
parameter values do not create large amplications.6 Our model compares this result
to the amplication eect of currency mismatch, which in our model is quantitatively
higher than the eect of agency costs.
There are several papers on the quantitative implications of the nancial acceler-
ator mechanism, but they all consider rms with fully dollarized liabilities. Gertler,
Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007) analyze the quantitative implications of balance sheet
eects in a small open economy with xed exchange rates and calibrate the model
to the case of Korea in 1997. They nd that the model is able to replicate the 12
percent drop in output, where the balance sheet eect accounts for about 50 percent
of output drop. Tovar (2005) presents a quantitative analysis of the real eects of the
4Throughout this paper, nancial fragility (robustness) means the elasticity of the risk premium
with respect to the real exchange rate is positive (negative).
5Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) calibrate a closed economy model with sticky prices. The
impact of a monetary shock shows an amplication on the eect on output from 1.0 percent to 1.4
percent. Christensen and Dib (2008) present a similar model with nominal contracts and monetary
policy that follows a Taylor-type of interest rate rule. A positive shock to the policy interest rate
amplies the output drop from 0.4 percent to 0.5 percent.
6Kocherlakota (2000) nds that exogenous borrowing constraints do not create amplication,
whereas with nancial constraints that depend on the value of collateral, amplication is only im-
portant for certain parameter values. Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) additionally consider the general
equilibrium eects on the interest rate in a closed economy model. With standard assumptions such
as CES utility and Cobb Douglas production function, large amplication of exogenous shocks is a
cutting edge result.
3balance sheet problem in an environment with sticky prices, and the use of monetary
policy as a tool to smooth these eects by including an additional expansionary eect
of exchange rates on output. The quantitative results show that devaluations are
expansionary despite the presence of balance sheet eects.
On the eects of nancial fragility, there is empirical evidence that higher dol-
larization and the resulting currency mismatch in assets and liabilities increases the
solvency risk of debtors and of the banking system, making the nancial system more
fragile and increasing the incidence of default.7 Even though our framework abstracts
from the existence of a banking system, nancial fragility is higher with more dollar-
denominated debt. As previously mentioned, higher dollarization means that there
is a larger currency mismatch between the value of output in soles and repayment.
This increases the probability of default, so that the lender has more incentives to go
through the costly verication process, which reects in an increase in the risk pre-
mium when a bad nancial shock hits the economy. As borrowing costs become larger,
the borrower is more nancially fragile and faces lower solvency, as the incentives and
capability of debt repayment are lower.
Empirical work on the importance of the currency composition of debt has been
analyzed in several papers, in terms of its eect on output performance (both growth
and volatility) and its eect on nancial fragility and incidence of crises. Reinhart,
Rogo, and Savastano (2003b) nd evidence of higher output volatility in highly dol-
larized economies, whereas the eect on output growth is not signicantly dierent.
Our model captures higher output volatility for economies with higher debt dollar-
ization. A higher ratio of dollar-denominated debt increases the currency mismatch
between the source of income of the domestic economy (output denominated in soles)
and the repayment value (interest rate payment for foreign currency borrowing). This
increases agency costs that entrepreneurs must pay to take debt, and therefore, in-
creases the cost of borrowing, which reduces optimal debt, investment and output,
amplifying the volatility of real variables in the model.
This model is also consistent with empirical studies that show that the degree of
currency mismatch in highly leveraged rms is a key feature aecting the impact of
exchange rates on the behavior of real aggregates, where countries with higher degrees
of nancial dollarization have experienced more frequent nancial crises than coun-
tries with a smaller currency mismatch.8 Firms without full hedge on the currency
composition of their liabilities face a sharp drop in investment and output when facing
currency depreciations during nancial crises.9 In this model, when a bad interest
rate shock hits the economy, the currency mismatch amplies the increase in the cost
of borrowing due to nancial frictions, with more severe drops in investment, output
7For instance, see De Nicolo, Honohan, and Ize (2003). Similar to Reinhart, Rogo, and Savas-
tano (2003a), they nd evidence that dollarization arises as an alternative source of nancing in
countries that lack macroeconomic stability. Highly dollarized countries are more exposed to cur-
rency mismatches in debtors balance sheets that undermine the quality of their loan portfolio when
large depreciations take place, increasing solvency risk as measured by the Z-index and the ratio of
non-performing loans.
8Levy-Yeyati (2006) nds that exchange rate uctuations have signicant eects on crises propen-
sity in the presence of nancial dollarization, compared to non-dollarized economies.
9Aguiar (2005) shows that partially hedged Mexican rms faced a reduction in net worth and
a sharp drop in investment during the Tequila crisis. Forbes (2002) presents evidence on a set of
emerging markets, where after large currency depreciations, highly leveraged rms have lower net
income growth.
4and consumption, more severe capital account reversals and larger real exchange rate
depreciations. Therefore, higher dollarization would reect into more frequent sudden
stop episodes, as dened by Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2008). The model also repli-
cates the connection between a higher frequency of sudden stop episodes and higher
liability dollarization, where balance sheet eects are more relevant when there is a
higher ratio of dollar denominated liabilities.
The welfare consequences are studied in Elekdag and Tchakarov (2007), where
they compare welfare under xed and exible exchange rate regimes for a small open
economy with balance sheet eects, and nd that only highly indebted countries
without credible monetary policy could achieve benets from a xed regime. Even
though we do not fully address a detailed analysis on the welfare implications of
dollarization, we nd that consumption is more volatile when a higher proportion of
debt is denominated in dollars. If the conditions established in Woodford (2002) are
satised, that is, when the stochastic steady state is close enough to the deterministic
steady state, this would imply that welfare is higher when debt is fully denominated
in soles.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
discusses the qualitative results of a change in the currency composition of liabilities
under exible exchange rate regimes, and the eects under a nancially robust and
nancially vulnerable economy. Section 4 presents a quantitative analysis of the
balance sheet channel in the case of Peru during the Russian Crisis, and compare the
results to the real eects of a currency depreciation if debt had been denominated
only in soles. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We lay out a general equilibrium framework in the spirit of recent open macroeco-
nomics literature. There is an innite-horizon small open economy, one single good
produced domestically by rms that employ both labor and capital, and two dier-
ent types of agents: households and entrepreneurs. The former supply labor force,
whereas the latter nance capital on behalf of rms. A key assumption of the paper is
that entrepreneurs have an initial endowment of net worth that is not enough to pur-
chase capital. Thus, they must look for additional means of funding, and borrowing
is subject to agency costs.
2.1 Firms
There is a continuum of rms indexed in the [0; 1] interval, which produce a single
good in a competitive environment. They all have access to a common technology





where Kt denotes capital input, Lt labor input, Yt home output, A is a positive time-
invariant parameter (also known as total factor productivity), and 0 <  < 1 is the
output elasticity of capital. The market for labor is characterized by monopolistic
5competition, since labor services oered by workers are heterogeneous. Using a Dixit-












where Lit refers to worker i's labor demand and  > 1 is the elasticity of demand for
worker i's services. Firms' prots are dened as follows:




where, as usual, Pt represents the price of the home good, Rt is what rms pay in
exchange for capital usage and Wit is worker i's wage, all expressed in soles.
Firms maximize their prots (3) subject to equations (1) and (2). For simplicity,
capital fully depreciates each period. The solution to this problem is standard. On
the one hand, rst order conditions show that:
RtKt = PtYt (4a)
WtLt = (1   )PtYt (4b)






1  denotes the minimum cost of one unit of Lt expressed





















where  > 1 governs the curvature of labor supply, 0 <  < 1 is the subjective discount
factor and Et(x) is the expected value of x conditional on information available at
time t. We assume additive separability between consumption and labor supply and
logarithmic utility function for convenience. As usual, Cit is a composite consumption















(1   )1  (7)
where 0 <  < 1 stands for the participation of home goods in the composite con-
sumption index. The price of the imported good is normalized to one and the price
of one unit of imports in soles is equal to the nominal exchange rate of St soles per
dollar, because the Law of One Price is assumed to hold. For later reference, let
Et  St=Pt be the prevailing real exchange rate.
6As in CCV, we assume that households cannot save and hence labor income is the




The household maximizes the expected utility (6) subject to (5), (7) and (8), which
implies in a symmetric equilibrium that:
QtCt = WtLt (10)






Households set their wages at the beginning of each period, before main aggregate
variables are observed. As wages are set in advance, it must be the case that:
EtL
t+1 = 1 (9)
2.3 Entrepreneurs
There is a continuum of risk-neutral entrepreneurs indexed in the [0; 1] interval,
who are initially allocated a positive net worth in domestic currency. Entrepreneurs
are supposed to invest in capital for the next period. However, we assume there is a
threshold in the distribution of entrepreneurs so that individuals above that threshold
are restricted from investing in physical capital.
Figure 1: Distribution of entrepreneurs. There is a threshold that divides the unit interval
in two segments. The position of the threshold is exogenous.
The threshold gives rise to two types of entrepreneurs, investors and savers (see
Figure 1). Investors use their initial net worth to nance capital acquisitions. Should
investors fall short of money, they may borrow additional resources either in foreign or
domestic currency. Debt in foreign currency is provided by the world capital market
at the risk-free interest rate given by 
t+1. On the other hand, debt in domestic
currency is provided by savers, who transform costlessly their endowments into bonds
and charge an interest rate in domestic currency equal to t+1.
Loosely speaking, we interpret the location of the threshold as the depth of the
domestic capital market, as in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003). In this economy,
7the ratio of dollarization (i.e. the ratio of debt issued in foreign currency to total debt)
is exogenously driven by the position of the threshold in the unit interval.
Investors arrange their portfolios according to the exogenously determined ratio
of dollarization. Given that they are risk neutral, the optimality condition establishes
that in order to have debt in two currencies in equilibrium, the expected cost of
borrowing in the two dierent markets must be the same. If the expected cost of
borrowing were strictly lower in one market, investors would choose to borrow only
in that currency. Hence the uncovered interest rate parity displayed in (12) is a
by-product of the entrepreneurs problem:
(1 + t+1) = (1 + 
t+1)Et (St+1=St) (12)
Now, if Qt is the price of capital, investors' budget constraint can be written as:
PtNI
t + Dt+1 + StD
t+1 = QtKt+1 (13a)
where Dt+1 and D
t+1 denote the amount borrowed in soles and dollars, respectively,
PtNI
t represents investors' net worth, Kt+1 accounts for the investment in t+1 capital,
and St is the nominal exchange rate. On the other hand, savers face the following
budget constraint:
PtNII
t = Dt+1 (13b)
Equations (13) reect the fact that savers' net worth has already been absorbed
by investors. This can be seen more clearly in Table 1, in which we depict the
entrepreneurs' balance sheets:
Investors Savers
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
PtNI
t









t soles, respectively. The latter transform these resources costlessly
into bonds Bt+1. Investors acquire these bonds worth Dt+1 soles, and also purchase D

t+1
dollars abroad to nance capital acquisitions.
The results from the optimal contract imply a relationship between the return on
capital investment and the risk premium similar to that of CCV. Because of informa-
tional asymmetries, borrowing is subject to frictions which in turn introduce a wedge




= (1 + 
t+1)(1 + t+1) (14a)
Et(Rt+1Kt+1)
QtKt+1
= (1 + t+1)(1 + t+1) (14b)
8where Rt+1 is the rental rate of capital at t+1 and t+1 is the so-called risk premium.
The risk premium is the same for debt in both currencies because it captures the
eect of the costly state verication problem, which is faced equally by both savers
and foreign lenders.10 In particular, the risk premium satises:






;F(1) = 1;F0() > 0 (15)
Finally, at the end of each period, investors collect the income from capital and
repay domestic and foreign debt. They consume a portion 1  of the remainder and
only consume imports. Thus, their net worth is:
PtNI
t =  [RtKt   tPtYt   (1 + 
t)StD
t   (1 + t)Dt] (16a)
where RtKt is aggregate capital income; tPtYt accounts for monitoring costs paid
in period t, while terms (1 + 
t)StD
t and (1 + t)Dt refer to debt repayments in
foreign and domestic currency, respectively. Similarly, savers entrepreneurs at the
end of each period collect the income from the repayment of domestic debt. They
consume a fraction 1  of this income, everything in terms of imported goods. Thus,
savers' net worth is:
PtNII
t = (1 + t)Dt (16b)
Equations (16) imply that entrepreneurs die with probability (1   ).11
2.4 Equilibrium
The full description of a competitive equilibrium is the content of the following de-
nition:
Denition 1 (Competitive equilibrium) Given f
t+1g1
t=0 and K0, the competi-





t=0, together with prices fWit;Wt;Pt;Rt;St;Qt;t+1;t+1g1
t=0
such that:
1. Firms: Taking fPt;Rt;Witg as given, rms choose fKt;Litg to maximize prots
(3) subject to (1) and (2).
2. Households: Taking fPt;St;Witg as given, each worker i chooses fLit;CH
it ;CF
itg
to maximize expected utility (6) subject to (5), (7) and (8).
3. Entrepreneurs: Taking fRt;St;Qtg as given, each investor chooses fDt+1;D
t+1g
so as to nance investment fKt+1g, subject to savers' participation constraint,
information and resource constraints.










10Appendix A discusses the derivation of the optimal contract.






















t+1 + tYt + X
(e) Balance of Payments:
StX   StCF
t   StKF
t+1   tPtYt + StD





t )(1=   1) = 0
In this small open economy, domestic production is absorbed by both residents
and non-residents. The market for home goods is in equilibrium when:
PtYt = Qt(Kt+1 + Ct) + StX (17)
where the left hand side is the nominal outcome, Ct is aggregate consumption and X
represents exports. The derivation of this equation can be found in the appendix.
In the next section, we will analyze the dynamics of the model by log-linearizing
the equilibrium equations around the non-stochastic steady state.
2.5 Dynamics
Monetary policy in this model, though not formally modeled, is conducted in a very
simple fashion. The monetary authority targets the home goods price index or, al-
ternatively, operates in an environment of exible exchange rates, as described in the
following denition:
Denition 2 (Flexible exchange rate regime) A regime of exible exchange rates
is one in which the monetary authority lets the nominal exchange rate st adjust to
market conditions. In particular, monetary policy is conducted so as to set pt =
Et 1pt = 0 for all t.
Since most resulting expressions are fairly standard, we only report the evolution
of the risk premium, which is the content of the following proposition:12
Proposition 1 (Risk premium) The rst-order dierence equation that describes










+ (1+)[(1   )(et   Et 1et)   (yt   Et 1yt)]
(18)
where lowercase letters denote percentage deviations from the non-stochastic steady
state,  is the share of investment demand in total non-consumption demand for
home goods,   is the steady state ratio of debt to net worth,  is the elasticity of
the risk premium with respect to leverage,  is a coecient that depends on the debt
contract and (1   ) represents the steady state ratio of dollarization.
12Appendix C shows all log-linearized expressions.
10The rst term in equation (18), as in CCV, is interpreted as follows. A higher
level of output requires more capital input, which, given that the entrepreneur's net
worth is not enough to nance capital, must be achieved by increasing debt. Higher
debt increases the debt burden in terms of home production, and therefore, the lender
charges a higher risk premium.
The eect of the currency denomination of debt is observed in the second term,
which amplies the response of the risk premium to shocks. An unexpected deval-
uation increases the entrepreneur's debt burden, as the value of repayment of the
dollar-denominated debt in terms of home goods increase, whereas the repayment
value of sol-denominated debt is not aected. Higher debt burden reduces the en-
trepreneur's net worth and therefore foreign lenders charge a higher risk premium.
The third term, related to the eect of an unexpected fall in output, is exactly
the same as in CCV, as it implies that lower unexpected output reduces the reward
for capitalists from previous investment regardless of the currency denomination of
debt. This results in lower net worth and higher risk premium.
The rst and last term show us that, regardless of the currency denomination of
debt, the presence of asymmetric information and imperfect capital markets require
agency costs to create the incentives that guarantee debt repayment. Therefore, even
under zero dollarization, the risk premium would still be aected by changes in output,
given the fact that higher output increases the entrepreneur's leverage and reduces
net worth.
3 Qualitative results
We assume that, starting from the steady state, there is a shock to the world safe
interest rate at t = 0, whose eects disappear from t = 1 onwards, because the
economy settles again on the saddle path toward the long run.13
We will derive two curves in the (kt+1;et) space, namely IS and BP, which
summarize the equilibria in the goods and loan markets, respectively. In order to
derive the BP curve, we use the equation for the risk premium in period 1, which is
the content of the following lemma:
Lemma 1 (Risk premium in period 1) The risk premium in period 1 is:
0
1 = e0;" (19)
where "  

  (1 + )(1   )   1 


is the elasticity of the risk premium with
respect to a change in the real exchange rate.
The sign of the elasticity determines whether an economy is nancially robust
(" < 0) or nancially vulnerable (" > 0). Notice that the ratio of dollar-denominated
debt (1 ) increases the size of this elasticity, making an economy more prone to be
nancially vulnerable.
With Lemma 1 at hand, we are now able to characterize the IS and BP curves
in this economy, as the next proposition shows:
13Appendix D demonstrates that under the assumptions addressed here, the introduction of sol-
denominated debt does not alter the saddle-path stability of the original system.
11Proposition 2 (IS and BP curves) Under exible exchange rates, the IS curve
is:
0 = k1; + (1   )e0; (20)
and the BP curve is:
k1; = [   (1   )"]e0; (21)
But, when we include the eect of the unanticipated increase in the foreign interest
rate, the BP curve becomes:
k1; = [   (1   )"]e0;   ~ 
1 (22)
where  < 0 is the saddle-path coecient in the linear relationship yt   et = 0
t.
Before the shock, we conclude from equations (20) and (21) that both curves
intersect at the origin. Nevertheless, when the shock is taken into account it is






(   1)" + 1
;
(   1) ~ 
1
(   1)" + 1

(23)
Now we will analyze the eect of a lower degree of dollarization using the IS-BP
diagram, after an unanticipated increase in the foreign interest rate. We will study
shortly what happens to the real exchange rate and capital when the economy is
either robust or vulnerable.
3.1 The Financially Robust Economy
Let " be the elasticity of the risk premium with respect to a change in the real
exchange rate that would prevail in a world with full dollarization, that is when
(1   ) = 1. Let BP be the associated curve that clears the loan market in the
(kt+1;et) Cartesian plane. From equation (20), we know that IS does not depend
on the ratio of dollarization (1   ), and hence its slope is invariant to changes in
. From equations (21) or (22), we also know that the slope of BP does depend on
(1   ) through the elasticity of the risk premium with respect to the real exchange
rate. Actually, BP is atter than BP as " > ".
In the case of a nancially robust economy, it is clear from (22) that both BP
and BP shift to the left after an unanticipated increase in the foreign interest rate.
The impact on both the real exchange rate and capital is less intense with partial
dollarization, that is when (1   ) < 1, as shown in Figure 2.
3.2 The Financially Vulnerable Economy
In the case of a nancially vulnerable economy, we may face a downward sloping BP
curve under certain parameter congurations, as depicted in Figure 3. In this context,
the impact of an unanticipated increase in the foreign interest rate on both the real
exchange rate and investment is less sharp with partial dollarization. Of course, since
12Figure 2: A nancially robust economy. Initially BP and IS intersect at the origin.
After an unanticipated increase in the foreign interest rate, BP shifts to BP
0
. The new
intersection occurs at (e0;;k1;). When  = 0, the relevant upward sloping BP would shift
to BP
0 and the intersection with IS would occur at (e0;k1).
net worth eects matter, both the real exchange rate and investment fall more on
impact than in the nancially robust case.
This result shows that a nancially vulnerable economy would nd benecial to
develop the market for domestic debt, as it makes an economy less prone to nancial
vulnerabilities and reduces the size of the balance sheet eect. The next proposition
summarizes this fact:




 (1+) . The
economy is nancially robust if (1 ) < (1 ). Otherwise, the economy is nancially
vulnerable.
If the economy succeeds in fostering nancial dedollarization so that (1 ) < (1 
), nancial unsoundness is no longer a feasible outcome. In particular, Proposition
3 says that if debt is contracted only in domestic currency, then the economy will be
13Figure 3: A nancially vulnerable economy. Initially BP and IS intersect at the origin.
After an unanticipated increase in the foreign interest rate, BP shifts to BP
0
. The new
intersection occurs at (e0;;k1;). When  = 0, the relevant downward sloping BP would
shift to BP
0 and the intersection with IS would occur at (e0;k1).
robust.
Corollary 1 (Zero dollarization) If debt is contracted only in domestic currency,
which implies in the limit that (1   ) = 0, the economy will always be nancially
robust.
Furthermore, with the possibility of reducing currency mismatch by borrowing in
domestic currency, a higher proportion of sol-denominated debt allows an economy
display a larger leverage ratio without becoming nancially vulnerable.
3.3 A digression on consumption and welfare
Following the previous analysis on the behavior of investment and real exchange rates,
we now focus on the behavior of consumption and how it is aected by the currency
14composition of debt. The details on the derivation can be found in the appendix. The
log-linearized behavior of consumption at each period is given by
ct = kt   (1   )et
Once again, there is a shock to the world safe interest rate at t = 0, whose eect
disappears from t = 1 onwards. The behavior of consumption in period t = 0 is given
by
co; =  (1   )
e 1
(   1)" + 1
As mentioned in Lemma 1, the ratio of dollar-denominated debt increases the size
of the elasticity, making an economy more prone to be nancially vulnerable. It is
easy to show that
dc0;
d < 0. Therefore, a positive shock in e 1 implies a larger fall in
consumption when the economy has a higher ratio of dollar-denominated debt. This
would imply a higher volatility of consumption in an economy with higher dollariza-
tion.
A rst order approximation of the welfare measure depends only on the volatility,
so that welfare is lower in an economy with a higher ratio of dollar-denominated debt.
When the deterministic steady state is close enough to the stochastic steady state,
the welfare comparison using a linear approximation gives similar results to a higher-
order one, as in Woodford (2002).14 This can also be seen from the second-order
approximation of the utility-based measure of welfare U(C;L).

















where uppercase letters with bars denote non-stochastic steady state values, E(x) is
the unconditional expected value of the random variable x, and V(x) is the uncondi-
tional variance of x. Also,  > 0 and O is the standard big o notation.
Under exible prices, this expression simplies to





If the conditions in Woodford (2002) are satised E(cj=0) = E(cj=1) = 0. There-
fore, changing the currency composition of debt from dollars to soles is welfare im-
proving if V(cj=1) < V(cj=0). We will revisit this condition in the next section.
A standard measure used in the literature to make welfare comparisons is the
equivalent variation with respect to steady state, as in Lucas (1987). The welfare
measure, ; is dened as the percentage increase in consumption required to achieve
the value of welfare in steady state:
1 X
t=0




14However, a complete analysis of welfare requires a second-order approximation of the model, as
mentioned by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004). A rst-order approximation of the policy functions
may yield spurious results when the stochastic steady-state diers from the deterministic steady
state, as in Kim and Kim (2003).
15Given that prices are exible in our model, aggregate labor is always chosen to
be at the steady state level. Using the utility functional form for the quantitative
exercise, this expression simplies to:
1 X
t=0
t log(  C) =
1 X
t=0
t log((1 + )Ct)
1 +  = exp((1   )
1 X
t=0
t log(  C=Ct))
4 Quantitative Analysis
In the previous section, we analyzed the qualitative implications of the currency com-
position of debt on the impact of exchange rate depreciation on output and invest-
ment. The results show that a higher proportion of sol-denominated debt reduces the
size of the balance sheet eect by making the economy more prone to be nancially
robust. Similarly, a lower level of debt also contributes to nancial robustness.
In this section, we use the model to analyze the relative size of the balance sheet
eect and its impact on output and investment during the Russian Crisis, and how
quantitatively relevant is the dedollarization could the dedollarization process be in
reducing the impact of currency depreciations on output and investment. We compare
the eects of an unanticipated increase in the world risk free interest rate on real
aggregates under the nancial conditions faced during the period prior the crisis and
compare them with the observed outcome.
In order to solve the model quantitatively, we compute numerically a log-linear
approximation of the decision rules for the variables in the model, following Klein
(2000) and Sims (2002). All variables in the system of equations are expressed as log
deviations from the deterministic steady state. Using the policy rules, we calculate
impulse response functions of real variables to the shock on the external interest rate
under each scenario.
4.1 Calibration
We calibrate the parameter values to the Peruvian economy. For the parameters
related to the real sector of the economy, we use standard values in the literature on
small open economy models. We do not directly target any moments for the variables
in the real sector, as these results will help us to assess the balance sheet eects of
the currency mismatch mechanism. The steady state world risk free rate is set at 4
percent, a standard value is small open economy models. The home good share in
consumption, ; is set at 0.8, based on the median of the distribution estimated by
Elekgad, Justiniano, and Tchakarov (2006)15. The capital share in the production of
the home good, ; is set at 0.45, value taken from the Quarterly Forecasting Model
from the Central Bank of Peru. The parameter  comes from the optimal contract
15This parameter is estimated to be between 0.6 and 0.99 for advanced economies in Lewis (1999),
and Elekgad, Justiniano, and Tchakarov (2006) use Bayesian methods to estimate this parameter
for Korea, and nd the median to be between 0.6 and 0.8
16and is set at 0.3. The discount factor, , is set at 0.96, a standard value for annual
data. For the value of , the fraction of entrepreneur's net income that goes to net
worth, we use the value from Cespedes, Chang, and Velasco (2000) of 0.92.
We calibrate the key parameters of the nancial sector to match the nancial
environment of the Peruvian economy during the Russian Crisis. The two parameters
that are calibrated are the elasticity of the risk premium with respect to the leverage
ratio, , and the steady state value of the risk premium, SS. For the risk premium, we
target a 5 percent risk premium, consistent with an average EMBI index of 500 basis
points in the period prior to the crisis, as documented by Castillo and Barco (2009).
The leverage ratio is targeted to a value of of 3.2, following the average leverage ratio
in Loveday, Molina, and Rivas-Llosa (2004) for a sample of two thousand non-nancial
rms.
Parameter Value Denition
 0.04 Risk free interest rate
 0.8 Home goods share in consumption
 0.45 Capital share in home good production
 0.96 Discount factor
 0.92 Entrepeneur's saving rate
 0.3 Parameter from optimal contract
Calibrated parameters
 0.05 Steady state risk premium
 0.03 Elasticity of risk premium with respect to leverage
Table 2: Parameter Values
4.2 Russian Crisis
In this section, we present the exercise for the two extreme cases, where debt is com-
pletely denominated in dollars, as in the benchmark CCV model, and the case where
all debt is denominated in soles. Comparing these results allows us to determine the
highest possible gain from dedollarization in terms of reducing output and investment
volatility and experiencing sharp real exchange rate depreciations.
We analyze the response of output and investment to a one-period unanticipated
increase in the world interest rate. We consider the case of a shock that is consistent
with a 600 basis points increase in the interest rate spread, as the one observed
during the Russian crisis. The calibration used to match the average risk premium
and leverage ratio prior to the Russian crisis is consistent with a nancially vulnerable
economy, as the elasticity of the risk premium with respect to the exchange rate is
positive.
The mechanism in the model works as follows. A nancially vulnerable economy
suers a larger output fall than a nancially robust economy. In both cases, the
opportunity cost of savers of lending in soles goes up, and therefore they will require
that investors pay a higher interest rate.
In addition, under a nancially vulnerable case, the risk premium increases with
unexpected devaluation. An increase in the world interest rate depreciates the ex-
change rate, which reduces the capitalist's net worth and increases the debt burden in
17terms of home output. Due to imperfect capital markets, lenders will ask for a higher
risk premium to compensate for the higher debt burden. Therefore, a nancially
vulnerable economy shows an amplication in output and investment drops.
In contrast, under a nancially robust case, the risk premium falls with unexpected
devaluation. Given the higher cost of borrowing due to the unexpected increase in the
foreign risk free rate, investors take less debt, reducing the size of leverage. Foreign






























































Consumption of Home Goods
Figure 4: Impulse Response to a World Interest Rate Shock Consistent with a 600 Basis
Point Increase in EMBI. Financially Vulnerable and Financially Robust Economy. Years
depicted on the horizontal axis.
Figure 4 shows the response to an increase in the world interest rate consistent
with a 600 basis point increase in country risk, as the one that was experienced
in Peru during the Russian Crisis. For this calibration, we nd that the economy
economy would be classied as nancially vulnerable according to the denitions in
the previous section.
The sharp fall in investment reects the increase in the cost of borrowing, through
the eects of both a higher world interest rate and a higher risk premium. An increase
in the world interest rate increases asymmetric information problems, so that there
is a larger state space where agents would not repay their debt. Therefore, a higher
risk premium is reecting the increase in monitoring costs. Lower investment reduces
the production possibilities of rms, and therefore, the sharp drop in output in the
following period. This aects the payment to factors of production in t = 1 onwards,
as a lower capital-to-labor ratio implies lower wages for workers in equilibrium. The
rental rate of capital increases given the lower capital-to-labor ratio, making each unit
18of capital more valuable for investors, which should also be reected in an increase in
the price of capital.
From the household's perspective, under exible prices, aggregate level of labor
is always at steady state, so that aggregate income made by households falls due to
lower wages. This implies that consumption falls as well. Analyzing consumption of
home goods and imported goods separately we can identify two eects. On impact, at
t = 0, there is a reduction in consumption of foreign goods, as the real exchange rate
depreciates. In the next period, t = 1, there is an additional eect due to a reduction in
the consumption of home goods. Given the functional form of aggregate consumption,
households expenditure on domestic goods is a  fraction of their income. As labor
income falls, their consumption of home goods decreases as well.
We simulate the model for a baseline scenario, where we use a dollarization ratio
of 100 percent, consistent with the benchmark model presented in CCV. The impulse
response functions for this scenario are plotted with red lines in Figure 4 and are
labeled as \Dollar". Each period corresponds to one year and the response of each
variable is measured as percentage deviations with respect to their steady state.
The results for the baseline dollarization ratio predicts an output fall of 5.3 percent,
whereas the output growth rate decreased from 6.9 percent in 1997 to -0.9 percent
in 1998, after the Russian Crisis took place. Investment shows a similar pattern,
with a predicted reduction of 11.7 percent, whereas investment growth rate fell from
16.3 percent in 1997 to -2.4 percent in 1998. The real exchange rate depreciation
is predicted to be 13.1 percent, compared to the actual depreciation of 22 percent
in 1998. Therefore, the model predicts that the balance sheet eect accounts for
approximately 70 percent of the output drop and 60 percent of the investment drop
and the real exchange rate depreciation. Notice that the model is simplied to focus
on the balance sheet channel, and it ignores other aspects of the crisis, such as the
eects of terms of trade shocks and exports.
Also, we must consider the fact that empirical work on the eects of nancial crises
in Peru show that there was a severe credit crunch during the Russian Crisis, where
agents were not able to access external nancing, regardless of the cost of borrowing.
This eect is not considered in the model, but introducing this additional channel
should help to explain larger output and investment drops.
The high level of currency mismatch in Peru during the 1990s might be related
to the sharp drops in output and investment. In order to analyze the quantitative
signicance of dollarization in this model, we analyze the real eects under an economy
with the same initial conditions as during the Russian Crisis, except for a lower level of
debt dollarization. We repeat the exercise for the case where all debt is denominated
in soles. As shown in the qualitative analysis, when (1   ) = 0, the economy is
always in the nancially robust case.
The blue line in Figure 4 shows the impulse response functions for the extreme
case where all debt is denominated in domestic currency, and is labeled as \Soles".
An unanticipated increase in the world interest rate depreciates the exchange rate.
If all debt is denominated in soles, the valuation of debt in terms of the home good
does not change, as is the case of dollar denominated debt. Output falls by a smaller
magnitude, given that it faces a higher domestic interest rate but a smaller risk
19premium. This second eect is explained by the elasticity of the risk premium with
respect to net worth. As shown by Lemma 1, an economy with only sol-denominated
debt always faces a negative elasticity of the risk premium with respect to the real
exchange rate.
Therefore, even though there are still negative eects on real variables, these are
quantitatively smaller than under fully dollarized debt. The intuition is as follows.
Given the negative elasticity of the risk premium, an increase in the world interest
rate reduces the risk premium, which partially osets the increase in borrowing costs
due to an increase in the interest rate. Therefore, a smaller increase in borrowing
costs implies smaller drops in investment and output.
The payments to factors of production have milder eects as well. A reduction
in the capital-to-labor ratio reduces wages and increases the rental rate of capital,
but the magnitudes are smaller than in the fully-dollarized case. Consumption also
falls, but the drop less intense, as explained in the digression on consumption and its
relationship with the currency composition of debt.
Also, we should take into account that, even under the case with only sol-denominated
debt, there is still a nancial friction regarding the asymmetric information problem,
and therefore, a wedge between the interest rate and the return on capital remains.
However, by comparing the currency composition of debt, this wedge becomes smaller
as more debt is denominated in domestic currency.
The quantitative results show that the output drop is reduced from 5.3 to 4.5
percent, whereas investment falls by 9.9 percent, compared to 11.7 percent when we
considered dollar denominated debt. The economy would face a real depreciation of
11.0 percent, lower than in the benchmark case. Overall, these results show that there
are some improvements in the real eects of an unanticipated foreign interest rate
shock, consistent with the empirical literature where lower dollarization is associated
with less frequent nancial crisis and smaller balance sheet eects.
For economies that take debt in both currencies, as stated in Proposition 3, a dol-
larization ratio that is lower than 1    means that the economy is nancially robust.
This implies that for low values of the dollarization ratio, the amplication eect
of currency mismatch are milder than for higher values. We simulate the economy
for a grid of dierent dollarization ratios to analyze the quantitative relevance of the
amplication mechanism under each scenario. Figure 5 shows the impulse response
functions for dierent currency compositions of debt. As in Figure 4, all impulse
responses are measured as percentage deviations from steady state. Each line repre-
sents dierent currency composition of debt, where the one labeled   represents the
case with a constant risk premium.
Table 3 shows the one-period eect on real variables to an increase in the world
interest rate for dierent values of the dollarization ratio. The results are consistent
with the qualitative analysis, where a higher dollarization ratio increases the currency
mismatch of rms' balance sheets and amplies the negative eect on real variables.
Following CCV, we establish   as the threshold between a nancially robust and a
nancially vulnerable economy, that is when there is a risk premium that is inelastic
to exchange rate depreciations. For the parameters in the quantitative exercise, this

























































Figure 5: Impulse Response to a World Interest Rate Shock Consistent with a 600 Basis
Point Increase in EMBI. Economies with debt in dollars and soles. Years depicted on the
horizontal axis.
Notice that dollarization ratios that are higher than 1    , such as 40 percent
in Peru during the Russian crisis, would imply that the economy was nancially
vulnerable and therefore experienced an additional amplication of the eects on real
variables.
Dollarization ratio (1-)
0 0.2 1     0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Output -4.5 -4.6 -4.61 -4.75 -4.90 -5.07 -5.30
Investment -9.9 -10.2 -10.3 -10.6 -10.9 -11.3 -11.7
RER 11.0 11.4 11.4 11.7 12.1 12.5 13.1
Welfare () 0.010 0.015 0.015 0.020 0.025 0.030 0.036
Table 3: Welfare analysis
It is also relevant to compare these results to a model with no nancial frictions,
to evaluate the relative importance of the eects of dedollarizing debt. We simulate
the model without nancial frictions, by eliminating the wedge between the interest
rate and the return on capital (and therefore a zero risk premium at all times). The
results are shown in Figure 4 by the black lines labeled as \No Frictions". An increase
in the world interest rate by one standard deviation results in an output drop of 4.5
percent and an investment drop of 10.1 percent, whereas the real depreciation is
12.3 percent. These results are in line with work such as Kocherlakota (2000) and
Cordoba and Ripoll (2004), where under standard parameter values, the amplication
eect introduced by endogenous nancial frictions is very small. Compared to this
21result, the introduction of a currency mismatch increases amplication by a larger
magnitude, showing the potential benets of policies oriented to dedollarization.
The model is able to capture several stylized facts obtained in the empirical lit-
erature on the eects of debt dollarization on output and nancial fragility. Higher
debt dollarization, as the one used in the benchmark scenario, leads to higher output
volatility as in Reinhart, Rogo, and Savastano (2003b), as the cost of borrowing
becomes more volatile due to the eects of currency mismatch. A larger currency
mismatch increases the volatility of output measured in dollars and results in more
volatile monitoring costs. Therefore, the borrower must pay a more volatile risk pre-
mium, which results in more volatile investment and output. Higher nancial fragility
is also associated with higher debt dollarization as higher volatility of output in terms
of debt repayment increase the probability that agents would prefer not to repay, and
translate into more volatile agency costs and risk premium. Regarding the frequency
of nancial crises and sudden stop episodes, the results show a higher drop in foreign
debt when a bad shock hits the economy under higher debt dollarization, consistent
with larger capital account reversals for countries with high liability dollarization.
Finally, we simulate the model for 10,000 periods and compute the variance of
consumption deviations from the deterministic steady state for debt denominated
in dollars and in soles to give as an approximate measure of welfare. The variance
of consumption is 0.007 for the benchmark case with full dollar denominated debt,
larger than the variance of consumption 0.0042 with full sol-denominated debt. If the
stochastic steady state is close enough to the deterministic steady state, as mentioned
in Woodford (2002), this implies that welfare is higher in the environment with sol-
denominated debt.
We also calculate the equivalent variation as an approximate measure of welfare
loss compared to an economy in steady state. We follow the denition of this welfare
measure, , as presented previously. The results of the equivalent variation, , is
shown in Table 3 for dierent values of the dollarization ratio. Consistent with the
previous section on welfare implications, higher debt dollarization is welfare reducing,
although the eect on welfare is very small.
5 Conclusions
This work reevaluates the equilibrium properties of the model presented originally
by CCV, letting entrepreneurs borrow in both domestic and foreign currency. Under
the assumptions introduced here, it is observed that a lower ratio of dollarization
reduces the eect of real exchange rate depreciations on investment and production
decisions under a exible exchange rate regime. The lower the degree of dollarization,
the less dramatic the net worth eects are. Not trivially, Lemma 1 says that if debt is
contracted only in domestic currency, the economy will always be nancially robust.
The quantitative results show the eects of de-dollarization in the Peruvian econ-
omy and how nancial fragility in the sense of higher debt dollarization amplied the
real eects during the Russian Crisis. The model is able to account for around 70
percent of the output and investment drops in the case of the Russian Crisis, whereas
it accounts for 50 percent of the exchange rate depreciation. As shown in both the
22qualitative and quantitative analysis, a lower level of dollarization would have reduced
the impact of a nancial crisis. Full sol-denominated debt in the model would imply a
lower output drop of 4.8 percent, instead of the drop of 5.7 percent in the benchmark
calibration.
Notice that the quantitative analysis assumes full capital depreciation as in CCV.
Partial capital depreciation would reduce the size of the amplication mechanism,
as entrepreneurs would face lower debt requirements and therefore a lower leverage
ratio. As the cost of nancing is increasing in leverage, lower leverage would result in
a smaller increase in the risk premium and milder eects on output, investment and
real depreciation.
Another assumption in this work is that the currency composition of debt is taken
as exogenous. However, Chang and Velasco (2006) and Chamon and Hausmann
(2005), among others, claim that dollarization has endogenous roots that may be
dependent on the exchange rate regime expected to prevail in the economy. When
individuals expect exible exchange rates, they borrow in domestic currency, whereas
the composition of debt would be indeterminate when individuals expect fully credible
xed exchange rates. This is consistent with our results. If the supply of debt in
soles were higher than the demand for debt by entrepreneurs, as when  = 1, they
would take all debt in soles. However, given that there is a shortage in the supply
of sol-denominated debt, investors must nance the dierence by taking some dollar
denominated debt.
The framework presented in this work is a simplied version because the main
objective is to focus on the eect of the currency composition of rms' liabilities on
the magnitude of the balance sheet eect. Further work on an extension of the model
should include other channels that are highly relevant in the behavior of output and
investment, such as the impact of terms of trade shocks and commodity prices in
the Peruvian economy. During the nancial crises analyzed in this work, exports
were severely aected through the worsening of terms of trade, which further reduced
output and investment.
References
Aguiar, M. (2005): \Investment, devaluation and foreign currency exposure," Jour-
nal of Development Economics, 78(1), 95{113.
Bernanke, B., M. Gertler, and S. Gilchrist (1999): \The nancial accelerator
in a quantitative business cycle framework," in Handbook of Macroeconomics, ed.
by M. Taylor, and M. Woodford, vol. 1. North-Holland.
Caballero, R., and A. Krishnamurthy (2003): \Excessive dollar debt: Financial
development and underinsurance," Journal of Finance, 58(3), 867{893.
Calvo, G., A. Izquierdo, and L. Mejia (2008): \Systemic sudden stops: The
relevance of balance-sheet eects and nancial integration," Working Paper 14026,
National Bureau of Economic Research.
23Carlstrom, C., and T. Fuerst (1997): \Agency costs, net worth and business
uctuations: A computable general equilibrium analysis," American Economic Re-
view, 87(5), 893{910.
Castillo, P., and D. Barco (2009): \Crisis nancieras y manejo de reservas en el
Peru," Revista Estudios Economicos, 17, 85{112.
Cespedes, L., R. Chang, and A. Velasco (2000): \Balance sheets and exchange
rate policy," Working Paper 7840, National Bureau of Economic Research.
(2004): \Balance sheets and exchange rate policy," American Economic
Review, 94(4), 1183{1193.
Chamon, M., and R. Hausmann (2005): \Why do countries borrow the way they
borrow?," in Other people's money: Debt denomination and nancial stability in
emerging market economies, ed. by B. Eichengreen, and R. Hausmann. University
of Chicago Press.
Chang, R., and A. Velasco (2006): \Currency mismatches and monetary policy:
A tale of two equilibria," Journal of International Economics, 69(1), 150{175.
Christensen, I., and A. Dib (2008): \The nancial accelerator in an estimated
new keynesian model," Journal of Economic Dynamics, 11(1), 155{178.
Cordoba, J., and M. Ripoll (2004): \Credit cycles redux," International Eco-
nomic Review, 45(4), 1011{1046.
De Nicolo, G., P. Honohan, and A. Ize (2003): \Dollarization of the banking
system: Good or bad?," Working Paper 03146, International Monetary Fund.
Eichengreen, B., and R. Hausmann (1999): \Exchange rates and nancial
fragility," Working Paper 7418, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Elekdag, S., and I. Tchakarov (2007): \Balance sheets, exchange rate policy and
welfare," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 31(12), 3986{4015.
Elekgad, S., A. Justiniano, and I. Tchakarov (2006): \An estimated small
open economy model of the nancial accelerator," IMF Sta Papers, 53(2), 219{
241.
Forbes, K. (2002): \How do large depreciations aect rm performance?," Working
Paper 9095, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Gertler, M., S. Gilchrist, and F. Natalucci (2007): \External constraints
on monetary policy and the nancial accelerator," Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking, 39(2), 295{330.
Kim, J., and S. Kim (2003): \Spurious welfare reversals in international business
cycle models," Journal of International Economics, 60(2), 471{500.
Klein, P. (2000): \Using the generalized Schur form to solve a multivariate linear
rational expectations model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 24(10),
1405{1423.
24Kocherlakota, N. (2000): \Creating business cycles through credit constraints,"
Quarterly Review Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 24(3), 2{10.
Levy-Yeyati, E. (2006): \Financial dollarization: Evaluating the consequences,"
Economic Policy, 21(54), 61{118.
Lewis, K. (1999): \Trying to explain home bias in equities and consumption," Jour-
nal of Economic Literature, 37(2), 571{608.
Loveday, J., O. Molina, and R. Rivas-Llosa (2004): \Mecanismos de transmi-
sion de la politica monetaria y el impacto de una devaluacion en el nivel de las
rmas," Revista Estudios Economicos, 12.
Lucas, R. (1987): Models of business cycles. Basil Blackwell.
Reinhart, C., K. Rogoff, and M. Savastano (2003a): \Addicted to dollars,"
Working Paper 10015, National Bureau of Economic Research.
(2003b): \Debt intolerance," Working Paper 9908, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research.
Schmitt-Grohe, S., and M. Uribe (2004): \Solving dynamic general equilibrium
models using a second-order approximation to the policy function," Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control, 28(4), 755{775.
Sims, C. (2002): \Solving linear rational expectations models," Computational eco-
nomics, 20(1-2), 1{20.
Tovar, C. (2005): \The mechanics of devaluations and the output response in a
DSGE model: How relevant is the balance sheet eect?," Working Paper 192,
Bank of International Settlements.
Woodford, M. (2002): \Ination stabilization and welfare," Contributions to
macroeconomics, 2(1).
25Appendix A: Sketch of the derivation of the risk pre-
mium
Consider the contracting problem between a single investor, indexed by j, and both
savers and foreign lenders in any period t. At the time of contracting, j's net worth
PtN
I;j
t , the dollar interest rate 
t+1, the sol interest rate t+1, and prices in period
t are known. Assume for the time being that the period t + 1 rental rate on capital
in dollars, Rt+1=St+1, is known.
Both types of entrepreneurs and foreign creditors are risk neutral. Their joint
problem is to choose a level of investment K
j
t+1, a dollar loan D
j
t+1, a sol loan D
j
t+1,
and a repayment schedule so as to maximize the expected return to savers, so that
lenders are paid at least their opportunity cost of funds, subject to resource and
information constraints.






t+1(Rt+1=St+1) dollars next period, where
!
j
t+1 is a random shock. The distribution of this variable is widely known and is such
that !
j
t+1 is i.i.d. across j and t, and its expected value is one. I assume that the
realization of !
j
t+1 cannot be observed by lenders (both savers and foreign agents),







t+1 is observed freely by the investor.
CCV argue that these conditions imply a standard debt contract, which stipulates
a xed repayment, say of B
j
t+1 dollars and B
j
t+1 soles; if the investor cannot pay,
lenders monitor the outcome and seize all the outcome. It is noticeable that this
situation occurs as long as !
j





t+1=St+1 =  !K
j
t+1(Rt+1=St+1), monitoring happens whenever  ! is above !
j
t+1.
Then, the problem is to provide lenders with expected returns of t+1 and 
t+1.




















and using equation (12) in its deterministic version, the right hand side becomes:
= (1 + 
t+1)St+1D
j






























where H() denotes the c.d.f. of !
j
t+1, and H( !) is the probability of bankruptcy.
The left hand side of equation (A.1) gives the expected dollar yield on investment.





t+1. The second and subsequent inequalities reect that borrowing must equal the
value of investment minus the investor's net worth.












subject to equation (A.1), which once simplied yields:
jt   1 = (1 + t+1)jt

















is the ratio of the value of investment to net worth, and





is the risk premium.16
We can also derive the behavior of the risk premium in terms of the domestic inter-























Once simplied, the participation constraint yields:
1 + t+1 =
Rt+1
(1 + t+1)Qt
It is possible to express the entrepeneur's problem in terms of jt, as maximizing







t+1)    !(1   H( !))

jt (A.6)
Then, the problem reduces to choosing both jt and  ! to maximize equation (A.6)
subject to equation (A.3). It is clear that the analysis concerned here is close to that
of CCV, so the ninth footnote in the main text holds.
Specically, CCV show that under suitable conditions  ! is an increasing function
of 1 + t+1 (notice that the risk premium is a parameter of the investor's problem),
or in its inverse form:
1 + t+1 = ( !) (A.7)
where () is an increasing and dierentiable function in the (0;!) domain, and







16Notice that this expression is very similar to equation (14a) in the main text. In fact, in the
absence of uncertainty, both equations are the same.
27conditions. Here, the optimal cuto depends only on the risk premium, that is, it is
orthogonal to j's net worth.
Then, the authors argue that the optimal investment/net worth ratio, jt is also
a function of  !:
jt = 	( !) (A.8)
where 	() is also increasing and dierentiable in the (0;!) domain. Due to the





= 	( !) (A.9)
If equations (A.7) and (A.9) are combined, it is straightforward to get the risk
premium as a function of the value of total investment relative to total net worth:















where F is increasing and dierentiable and accounts for equation (15) in the main
text.
Until now, the explanation has assumed certainty at the time of contracting. The
reader can consult the original work to see what happens if Rt+1=St+1 is not known
with certainty and is replaced by its expectation at t, in order to get equation (14a)
in the main text.
Appendix B: Non-stochastic steady state
To simplify expressions, we dene the following parameters in terms of steady state
values:  = D
D+SD,   = D+SD






N . The equations that characterize
the non-stochastic steady state of the model are:
Y = AK (B.1)
Q = S1  (B.2)
 =  (B.3)

















28Y =  [(1   )Y + QK] + SX (B.7)
Where equations (B.1), (B.2), (B.3), (B.4), (B.5), (B.6) and (B.7) are the steady
state versions of equations (1), (11), (12), (13a), (14a), (16a) and (17), respectively.
These equations, together with  and the value of  ! from the optimal debt contract
(see Appendix A), form a square system of nine equations in nine unknowns, namely,
Y;S;K;Q;N;D;D; and .
Appendix C: Log-linearized system of equations
The log-linearization of equations (1), (11), (12) and (14a) around the non-stochastic
steady state, together with (18) and (D.2), yields, respectively:17
yt = kt + (1   )lt (C.1)
qt   pt = (1   )(st   pt) (C.2)
~ t+1 = ~ 
t+1 + Et (st+1   st) (C.3)
~ 
t+1 =  0
















+ (1+)[(1   )(et   Et 1et)   (yt   Et 1yt)]
(C.6)
These equations and the monetary policy rule (pt = 0 for exible exchange rates)
characterize the behavior of yt, pt, qt, kt, st, t and t. Additionally, we can use the
log-linearization of equations (4b), (13a), (15) and (16a) around the non-stochastic
steady state to get the values of dt, d
t, nt and wt.
wt   lt = pt   yt (C.7)
pt + nt =
QK
N











t+1   st) (C.8)












respect to  ! and " is the elasticity of the  function in equation (A.10).
29pt + nt =
Y
N


























(dt + ~ t + ~ 





Proof of Proposition 1. The third term of the RHS of equation (C.10), after
plugging equations (C.3), (C.4), (C.8) and (C.9) is:

1   Y
N (1   )
n
 0









































=  (1 + )
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= (1 + ) 












+ (1 + )(1    )

0
t + (qt   pt + kt+1   yt) +
(1 + )  fst   pt   Et 1(st   pt)   (yt   Et 1yt) +  [Et 1(st   st 1)   (st   st 1)]g






  [1 + (1 + ) ]
= (1 +  )(1 + )(1 + )   [1 + (1 + ) ]




t = (qt   pt + kt+1   yt)
+ (1+)fst   pt   Et 1(st   pt)   (yt   Et 1yt)    [(st   st 1)   Et 1(st   st 1)]g
(D.1)





30Plug equations (4b) and (10) into equation (17) and log-linearize the resulting
expression:
pt + yt =

1   (1   )
QK
Y
(qt + kt+1) +
st
1   (1   )
SX
Y
Then, substitute equations (B.5) and (B.7) to get:
yt =

[1   (1   )](1 + )(1 + )
(qt + kt+1   st) + st   pt
Finally, after setting  =







(st   pt) = qt   pt + kt+1 (D.2)
After plugging this last equation (D.2) into equation (D.1), one obtains equation
(18) in the main text.
Proof of Lemma 1. Replace time subscripts in equation (18) and recall that under
exible exchange rates it must be the case that 0
0 = E0e1 = E0y1 = E0s1 = y1 = 0 .
Therefore, the second term of the RHS of equation (18) is equal to  (1+)(e0  
s0). But, since e0 = s0, it is straightforward to reach equation (19).
Proof of Proposition 2. For the IS curve, replace time subscripts in equations
(C.1), (C.2) and (C.5), and recall that in the period of the shock, l0 = k0 = y0 = 0
under exible exchange rates. On the other hand, for the BP curve, replace time
subscripts in equations (C.1), (C.2) and (19) under perfect foresight, and then use
zt = 0
t (see section on saddle path coecient). Aditionally recall that z1 = y1   e1
and l1 = 0 under exible exchange rates.
Proof of Corollary 1. Replace  = 1 in the denition of the elasticity of the risk
premium with respect to a change in the real exchange rate. Since 0 <  < 1, then
the elasticity is always negative and hence the economy is nancially robust.
Saddle-path coecient. Under perfect foresight, if zt = yt   et denotes home











We rearrange equations (C.4) and (D.2); recall that there is perfect foresight and
the denition of the real exchange rate. Then replace equations (C.1) and (C.2) into
the former ones to get, respectively:
yt = 

(1   )et +  1yt+1

+ (1   )et
yt+1  





t+1 + et+1   et
Using these two expressions, it is possible to show that in equilibrium:
zt+1 =  1zt + 0
t+1 + ~ 
t+1 (D.4)
31Then, equations (D.3) and (D.4) describe the perfect foresight dynamics of both
zt and 0
t, provided that ~ 
t+1 = 0. CCV state that in period t the risk premium 0
t
is known, but output measured in dollars zt is not. However, as in the original work,
it is possible to nd a stable saddle path, which links both terms through a negative
saddle path coecient . It can be shown that there is a unique linear relationship
such that zt = 0
t, where if the risk premium rises above its steady state level, the
output measured in dollars will fall below its steady state level, and vice versa.
This demonstrates that under the assumptions addressed here, the introduction of
sol-denominated debt does not alter quantitatively the stability of the original system.
That is, the composition of debt does not inuence the saddle path but only the total
amount of outstanding debt in the steady state.
Derivation of the Budget Constraint. Deriving the budget constraint
PtYt = RtKt + WtLt
= RtKt + PtCH
t + StCF
t (D.5)





+ tPtYt + (1 + 
t)StD
t + (1 + t)Dt (D.6)











t ) = 0
(D.7)





+ tPtYt + (1 + 
t)StD





t+1   tPtYt + StD









t + (1 + t)Dt + PtCH







Savers face the following budget constraint,
PtNII
t = Dt+1 (D.8)
At the end of each period, savers collect the income from the repayment of domestic
debt. They consume a 1    fraction of this income, everything in terms of imported
goods. Thus, savers' net worth is:
PtNII
t = (1 + t)Dt (D.9)
Using equations (D.8) and (D.9),
32PtYt = QtKt+1   StD
t+1   Dt+1 + (1 + t)Dt + PtCH
t + StX   StKF
t+1 + StD







t+1 + (1 + t)Dt + PtCH
t + StX   StKF
t+1   (1 + t)Dt
= Qt(Ct + Kt+1) + StX (D.10)
Digression on consumption and welfare. Similar to the qualitative analysis on
the behavior of investment and real exchange rates in the previous section, we analyze
the response of consumption to a shock in the world interest rate and how it is aected
by the currency composition of debt.
















Log-linearizing this equation in an economy with exible prices (pt = 0) :
ct = kt   (1   )et
Following the previous analysis, we assume a shock to the world safe interest rate
at t = 0, whose eects disappear from t = 1 onwards. The behavior of consumption
in period t=0 is given by
co; = k0;   (1   )e0

























Therefore,after a positive shock e 1; there is a larger fall in consumption when the
economy has a higher ratio of dollar denominated debt.
co;=0 < c0;=1 < 0
33